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THE STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS
INITIATIVE: AN EXAMPLE OF
BILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATION
Mitsuo Matsushita*
INTRODUCTION
In June 1990, the governments of the United States and Japan con-
cluded the Structural Impediments Initiative ("SII"), a series of bilat-
eral trade negotiations.! The SII came about as a result of a large
trade imbalance between the two countries in favor of Japan, which,
despite many efforts, the United States and Japan had been unable to
reduce. It was the U.S. government's perception that the real cause of
the trade imbalance was not Japan's protective border measures in the
form of tariffs or quantitative restrictions, such as import quotas on
agricultural and leather products, but rather the oligopolistic indus-
trial sector in which large companies linked together by stock-holdings
and interlocking directorates exclude outside parties from transac-
tions. This perception on the part of the United States was what initi-
ated the SII.
The SII is unique in the sense that it dealt with subjects not usually
on the agenda of international trade negotiations. Most of the SII ne-
gotiations concerned matters of domestic policy and regulation, such
as public expenditure, land use policy, restrictive business behavior,
close inter-corporate relationships and the system by which goods are
distributed. Not surprisingly, the SII was criticized both in the United
States and Japan. Japanese critics felt that the U.S. government was
trying to interfere with Japanese domestic matters. In the United
States, some critics believed that the SII would have a minimal effect,
if any, on the trade imbalance.
Nevertheless, the SII serves an important function as a model for
future trade negotiations. As international economic relationships be-
come closer and trade restrictions in the form of border measures de-
crease, it becomes increasingly important to reduce differences
between national economic institutions and to harmonize both formal
* Professor of Law, University of Tokyo; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan
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I. The Final Report of the SII was submitted to President Bush and Prime Minister Kaifu on
June 28, 1990. JOINT REPORT OF THE U.S.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP ON THE STRUCTURAL
IMPEDIMENTS INITIATIVE (1990) [hereinafter SII REPORT].
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laws and regulations as well as informal business customs. Differences
in taxation, technical standards, industrial policies, the regulation of
business activities, and business customs and corporate behavior may
hinder the expansion of transnational business activities. In the fu-
ture, therefore, reduction of such differences and the harmonization of
national economic institutions will, in a broad sense, become increas-
ingly necessary. In this respect, the SIT may be regarded as a forerun-
ner of future trade negotiations.
I. METHODS OF HARMONIZING NATIONAL ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS
Several attempts have been made in the past to harmonize national
economic institutions through international negotiation. The General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") at the multilateral level,
the European Common Market at the regional level, and the U.S.-
Canadian Free Trade Agreement at the bilateral level are examples of
earlier efforts.
A. Multilateral Negotiation - The GA TT Model
In recent decades, trade negotiations within the GATT have dealt
with the harmonization of national economic institutions, especially
with regard to technical standards and government procurement. Over
the course of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the
Contracting Parties agreed upon the Standards Code to deal with
trade barriers caused by differences in national technical standards.
The Standards Code establishes principles to be observed by the Con-
tracting Parties in order to minimize differences in technical stan-
dards. The Government Procurement Code is designed to address
essentially the same issue in the area of government procurement. In
both areas, domestic measures rather than border measures are of pri-
mary concern. 2
In the Uruguay Round, the basic issue in the areas of intellectual
property, trade in services and trade-related investment measures is
the harmonization of national institutions. This is especially true with
regard to intellectual property, where the aim of negotiations is to es-
tablish both a minimum standard for the protection of intellectual
property rights among nations and a uniform method of enforcing of
those rights.
If there are future GATT negotiations after the Uruguay Round,
2. For a discussion of the Standards Code and the Government Procurement Code, see gen-
erally J. JACKSON, J.-V. Louis & M. MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND (1984).
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there is little doubt that the harmonization of national economic insti-
tutions will be regarded as the major issue.
B. Regional Integration - The European Community Model
Experiments with the harmonization of national economic institu-
tions also exist at the regional level. The most successful regional ex-
ample is the European Common Market, where an important part of
the integration is aimed at the unification and harmonization of na-
tional economic laws and regulations. The Single Market Program,
which aims to bring the Common Market to completion by 1992, at-
tempts to harmonize national economic institutions in many areas in-
cluding technical standards, banking, taxation, corporate law,
intellectual property and environmental protection. This is achieved
through the European Ecomonic Community authority, which issues
directives in specific economic areas requiring the member states to
conform their national laws to common standards in those areas.
In the area of technical standards, for example, Member States are
required to maintain a certain minimum standard in their laws and
regulations, to recognize the laws and regulations of other Member
States and to accept commodities which conform to those laws. 3 An-
other example, the Second Banking Directive,4 establishes both a min-
imum standard in such areas as capital requirement, and the home
state rule, which requires Member States to recognize the banking reg-
ulations of another Member State. As a result of the home state rule,
a bank need only follow the laws and regulations of the Member State
in which it is established in order to operate throughout the Common
Market.
The harmonization of economic institutions is more advanced in
the Common Market than in other international economic alliances
such as the GATT. This is in large part due to the common heritage
and the geographical and cultural proximity of the Member States.
Without such geographical and cultural proximity, the Common Mar-
ket's methods of unifying domestic institutions may not always be ap-
plicable to other international efforts at harmonization. However, the
integration of national markets is progressing between the United
States and Japan, the United States and Canada, and Japan and Ko-
rea. The economic interests in harmonizing national economic institu-
tions of the countries involved in the process of integration are
somewhat similar to those of the Common Market Member States. In
3. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ftir Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
4. 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 386) 1 (1989).
[Vol. 12:436
SII: Bilateral Trade Negotiation
light of these common interests, some of the integration methods em-
ployed in the Common Market may be worthy of consideration when,
as with the SII, attempting to achieve harmonization of economic
institutions.
C. Bilateral Negotiations - The U.S.-Canadian Free Trade
Agreement Model
The U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement provides for the reduc-
tion of tariff and non-tariff barriers.5 Improved government procure-
ment procedures give enterprises of each country better access to
procurement bids offered by the government of the other country. In
the services industry, the agreement recognizes the right of enterprises
to establish and operate local business in the other party's territory. In
the financial areas, the agreement recognizes the right of enterprises of
each country to acquire financial companies in the other. The agree-
ment sets up a unique dispute settlement process whereby antidump-
ing and countervailing duty disputes are adjudicated by a panel
composed of experts from both countries whose rulings cannot be ap-
pealed. Continued use of this dispute settlement mechanism will have
the effect of harmonizing the enforcement of antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty statutes between the two countries.
Another remarkable feature of this agreement is the initiation of a
joint study with the goal of establishing common rules governing ex-
port subsidies and predatory pricing in exports. This could result in
the abolition of national antidumping and countervailing duty laws
with respect to U.S.-Canadian trade.
II. THE STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS INITIATIVE
The SII is devoted almost exclusively to reducing differences be-
tween economic institutions in Japan and the United States. Although
it is bilateral, the SII differs from the U.S.-Israeli Trade Agreement
and the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement in that it does not ad-
dress the issue of border measures. Instead, the major focus is on the
harmonization of internal economic policies. The SII is, therefore,
distinct from the models discussed above.
A. Background and Overview of the Structural
Impediments Initiative
In 1989, President Bush and Prime Minister Uno reached an
5. Although it will not be discussed here, the U.S.-Israeli Trade Agreement in another exam-
ple of the bilateral model.
Winter 19911
Michigan Journal of International Law
agreement establishing a joint task force to investigate formal and in-
formal trade barriers between the two countries. The task force was
made up of officials from the U.S. Departments of State, Treasury and
Commerce and members of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the Fi-
nance Ministry and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
Three meetings were scheduled, the first of which was held in Septem-
ber 1989, the second in February 1990 and the third in April 1990.
The task force published a final report on June 28, 1990, which it
submitted to President Bush and Prime Minister Kaifu. The report
contains recommendations which both governments are urged to im-
plement. Formally, the SII is nothing more than a study by the joint
task force on major trade obstacles between the two countries. It is not
a formal agreement, and noncompliance with the recommendations
would not constitute a violation of an international agreement. In ac-
tuality, however, noncompliance on the part of the Japanese govern-
ment would invite a strong reaction by the U.S. Congress in the form
of a retaliatory bill or a request to the Executive Branch to invoke
Super 301.6 In this sense, it should be regarded as an international
agreement or understanding in substance, if not in form.
The governments of both countries will review the results of the
SIT three times in the first year, twice in the following year, and a final
time in the third year.
B. The Structural Impediments Initiative Final Report
The final report of the SI is a document of approximately 100
pages containing findings on "structural impediments" in Japan and
the United States and recommendations on how to rectify them. To
characterize the recommendations generally, those concerning Japa-
nese impediments are concrete and those directed toward the United
States are more general and abstract.
1. Recommendations for Japan
The report lists six areas which the Japanese government is urged
to restructure: saving and investment patterns, land policy, the sys-
tem of production distribution, exclusionary business practices,
keiretsu relationships 7 and pricing mechanisms.
6. 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1988).
7. Keiretsu relationships are closely-tied corporate relationships characterized by mutual
stock-holdings, interlocking directorates and the like.
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a. Saving and Investment Patterns
In the area of savings and investment, 8 the targeted problem in
Japan is the high savings rate and the low rate of spending and con-
sumption. Public facilities such as roads, parks, sewage disposal and
housing are in need of funding. Current public expenditure is insuffi-
cient to meet the needs. The parties agreed that the Japanese govern-
ment would increase public spending by Y430 trillion during the next
decade.
b. Land Policy
The basic issue with regard to land policy concerns the exceedingly
high land prices in Japan which results in insufficient land available
for housing.9 It is increasingly difficult for an average person to
purchase a house. The high land price is also partly responsible for
the low rate of consumption. Measures to be taken under the SII
include a more active appropriation of land for public purposes, a re-
view of the Land Lease Law 10 and the House-Lease Law,11 a review of
divisions between Urbanization Promotion Areas and Urbanization
Control Areas,12 and the promulgation of specific deregulation meas-
ures. The aim of all the measures is to increase the supply of land and
stabilize land prices.
c. Distribution System
Measures proposed under the SII to restructure Japan's distribu-
tion system include improvement of the import-related infrastructure
and the promotion of expeditious and proper import procedures and
customs clearance procedures. t 3 The proposals also include deregula-
tion measures, among which the relaxation of control under the
Large-Scale Retail Stores Law' 4 is probably the most important. The
Large-Scale Retail Stores Law restricts the entry of new large-scale
retail stores (such as supermarkets) into local markets. The U.S. gov-
ernment believes that large-scale retail stores, which are not subsumed
in vertically integrated distribution networks organized by powerful
8. SII REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-1 - 1-9.
9. Id. at II-1 - 11-6.
10. Shakuchi h6, Law 49, 1921, as amended.
11. Shakka h6, Law 50, 1921, as amended.
12. An urbanization promotion area is an area designated by the government in which the
process of urbanization is encouraged. An urbanization control area, on the other hand, is an
area in which urban development is restricted to prevent the disorderly sprawling of cities.
13. SII REPORT, supra note 1, at III-1 - 111-16.
14. The Large-Scale Retail Stores Law (Daikibo kouri tenpo hd, Law 109, 1973).
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manufacturers and are relatively free from the control of manufactur-
ers, are thus more likely to purchase foreign goods than distributors
and retailers, who are subject to control by manufacturers. Therefore,
if Japan relaxes restrictions on the market entry of large-scale retail
stores, more foreign-made goods will be sold in Japan.
Under the current law, when a large-scale retail store intends to
enter a local market, it must undergo a series of examination proce-
dures in which the government determines whether the new retail
store would adversely affect small stores in the area. If the govern-
ment determines that the entry would have an adverse effect, it advises
that the time of entry be delayed or that store floor space be reduced.
The government can issue an order implementing the advice if the
store choses to ignore it. As a result of the SII, the Japanese govern-
ment has proposed to shorten these examination procedures.
Another proposed measure is the relaxation of control over pre-
mium offerings and advertisement under the Law to Prevent Unrea-
sonable Premium and Representation.' 5 Enterprises sometimes offer a
premium when they sell products to customers. This law authorizes
the Fair Trade Commission to establish a price ceiling setting the max-
imum allowable premium value. A premium offered at a value above
the maximum value violates this regulation. The law also authorizes
the Fair Trade Commission to prevent misrepresentations in advertis-
ing. Still another proposed item is the relaxation of liquor licenses
which will result in more liquor licenses for large-scale retail stores.
The Fair Trade Commission (the enforcement agency of the Anti-
Monopoly Law) has announced that it will formulate guidelines con-
cerning the enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law with regard to
anticompetitive conduct by private enterprises in distribution. The
Ministry of International Trade and Industry has also announced
guidelines and has established rules of conduct to be observed by pri-
vate enterprises.
d. Exclusionary Business Practices
Proposals to contend with exclusionary business practices include
a variety of measures such as stricter enforcement of the Anti-Monop-
oly Law, the introduction of greater transparency in administrative
guidance, government recommendations to private enterprise to
purchase parts and components on a non-discriminatory basis, and the
shortening of the examination period for a patent. 16
15. The Law to Prohibit Unreasonable Premium and Representation (Futokeihinrui oyobi
futohyouji boshi hd, Law 134, 1962).
16. S1I REPORT, supra note 1, at IV-I - IV-11.
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The Anti-Monopoly Law is of particular importance. The U.S.
government has claimed that the anticompetitive conduct of Japanese
enterprises has prevented foreign enterprises from effectively investing
and doing business in Japan. The United States also claims that,
although the provisions of the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law17 are
well drafted, enforcement has been lax, creating rigidity and exclusiv-
ity in the Japanese market and thereby making it difficult for foreign
enterprises to penetrate the market. The U.S. government has called
for stricter enforcement of the law.
The SII Report recommends that the Fair Trade Commission re-
place its current system of administrative guidance, warnings and
other informal regulatory measures with more formal procedures. In
addition to a budget increase for the Fair Trade Commission, the new
program calls for transparency in the enforcement process, an increase
in the maximum administrative fine imposed on cartels, and more ef-
fective criminal prosecution of cartels. The SII Report also recom-
mends a program to facilitate private damage suits by plaintiffs and
the adoption of stronger measures to prevent bid-rigging practices.
e. Keiretsu Relationships
The United States government has argued that keiretsu relation-
ships have created a business structure which excludes outside parties,
thus hindering the entry of foreign enterprises into the Japanese mar-
ket. Reciprocal dealings among the Japanese enterprises involved in
keiretsu relationships are said to be a cause of the exclusion. Under
the SII, the United States and Japan have agreed that the Fair Trade
Commission will announce guidelines on the enforcement policy di-
rected toward businesses linked by stock-ownerships and related mat-
ters and exclusive relationships among enterprises. 18
Japan and the United States also agreed to relax investment con-
trols under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law. 19
This law will be reviewed with an eye toward possible amendment,
which would include the introduction of a post-reporting system for
foreign investment in Japan instead of the current prior-reporting
system. 20
17. The Anti-Monopoly Law (Dokusen kinshi hd, Law 54, 1947). See M. MATSUSHITA & T.
SCHOENBAUM, JAPANESE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW 139-71 (1989).
18. SII REPORT, supra note 1, at V-I - V-7.
19. The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Gaikokukawase oyobi gaikoku-
boeki kanri hd, Law 228, 1949).
20. There is an exception for areas where the prior-reporting system is necessary for reasons
of national security and where the Japanese Government has withheld the liberalization under
Winter 1991]
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f. Pricing Mechanism
The issue with regard to pricing is whether or not there is an un-
due difference in price between Japanese products sold in Japan and
those exported to the United States.21 The United States suspects that
the price of Japanese products in Japan is generally higher than that in
the United States, indicating the existence of a rigid market structure
in Japan which prevents prices from fluctuating according to the oper-
ation of the market. The U.S. Department of Commerce and the Min-
istry of International Trade and Industry have engaged in joint
research on this price differential. Although results have been incon-
clusive, the two sides have agreed to continue joint research in the
future.
2. Recommendations for the U.S. Government
Compared with the measures to be taken by the Japanese govern-
ment, those directed at the United States are more general and ab-
stract. This is because the main purpose of the SII was to deal with
the "Japan Problem." The result thus emphasizes steps Japan should
take to alleviate the problem. The areas in which action is urged on
the part of the U.S. government include savings and investment pat-
terns, corporate investment activities and supply capacity for the im-
provement of U.S. competitiveness, corporate behavior, government
regulation, research and development, export promotion and work
force education and training.
Among the more important of these measures are savings and in-
vestment patterns,22 where the primary goal is to reduce the budget
deficit of the federal government. With regard to corporate invest-
ment activities, 23 treble damages suits under the U.S. antitrust laws
will be abolished for joint venture production. There will also be a
review of products liability law and possible recommendations for im-
provements. As a measure directed at corporate behavior,2 4 the U.S.
government will make recommendations to private enterprises to
adopt a long-range view in formulating their corporate management
strategies. With regard to government regulations, export control
under the Export Administration Act 2 5 implementing the COCOM
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Code of Liberalization of Capital
Movements.
21. SII REPORT, supra note 1, at V-I - V-7.
22. Id. at 1-12.
23. Id. at 13-17.
24. Id. at 18-20.
25. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (1988).
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agreement 26 will be relaxed, and voluntary export restraints in steel
will be gradually phased out.27 The agreement encourages the adop-
tion of the metric system as a measure aimed at research and develop-
ment. 28 To promote exports, the U.S. government will provide
American exporters with information on export-related matters. Fi-
nally, there will be an increase in the government's budget for work
force training.29
III. SALIENT FEATURES OF THE STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS
INITIATIVE TALKS
In the SII, unlike traditional trade negotiations, there is little em-
phasis on border measures. In fact, there is no single item in the SII
which deals with them. The SII places heavy emphasis on the possible
changes in domestic institutions and business customs which may have
indirect effects on trade.
The SII may be a prototype for future trade negotiations. After
border measures decrease, or are eliminated altogether, and business
activities become more transnationalized, differences in domestic eco-
nomic institutions, business customs and corporate behavior will be
the new obstacles to international business activities. In future trade
negotiations, therefore, the elimination or reduction of such differ-
ences will be the major objective.
While the GATT and the European Communities are experi-
menting with harmonization of national economic institutions with
varying degrees of success, the SII goes a step further..It involves not
only the reduction of differences in formal economic institutions, but
also the harmonization of corporate business behavior and customs.
The SII model may not, however, prove useful in other situations
because the circumstances under which it was conducted were unique.
The SII was initiated during a tense political and economic relation-
ship between Japan and the United States. The governments of the
two countries have stated that the SII is separate from the application
of Super 301 of the U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.30
26. COCOM refers to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. See 50
U.S.C. app. § 2404(i) (1988).
27. SII REPORT, supra note 1, at 21-23.
28. Id. at 28-29.
29. Id. at 30-37.
30. Super 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2420
(1988), provided that, in 1989 and 1990, the U.S. Trade Representative was to submit to Con-
gress a report in which the Representative was to enumerate practices of foreign governments
which could impede exports from the United States into those countries. From items listed in
the report, the United States Trade Representative was to select those impediments whose re-
Winter 1991]
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However, there is no doubt that Super 301 played a role in the events
leading up to the SII. In 1989, the U.S. Trade Representative named
three areas as "priority items" under Super 301: the purchase of
super-computers by the Japanese government,31 the purchase of satel-
lite equipment and the adoption of technical standards in wood prod-
ucts. These three areas were relatively narrow and manageable
because the objective of the U.S. Trade Representative was to avoid a
major confrontation with the Japanese government, which would have
resulted if more sensitive and fundamental issues such as market struc-
ture and corporate behavior in Japan had been Super 301 targets.
Such sensitive subjects were left to more informal negotiations be-
tween the two governments. Although the U.S. Congress would have
preferred to invoke Super 301 instead of resorting to the "softer ap-
proach" of the SII, any resulting confrontation would have negatively
affected the prospect of the Uruguay Round. The Executive Branch
therefore decided to adopt a softer approach and initiated the SII.
The SII reflects in several ways the tense political context in which
it was initiated. First, there is little symmetry between the measures to
be taken by the Japanese government and those which the U.S. gov-
ernment will take. However, it should be observed that this asymme-
try in obligations was inevitable since the SII was designed to deal
more with the "Japan Problem" than the "America Problem." Un-
dertakings by the Japanese government, which include the control of
exclusionary business practices and keiretsu relationships and the
modification of business behavior and customs will involve a major
change in the Japanese way of doing business. Second, although some
of the measures aimed at the United States necessitate changes in do-
mestic institutions, such as the introduction of the metric system, by
and large they are general. The general announcement to reduce the
federal budget deficit and recommendations to enterprises to adopt a
long-range corporate strategy exemplify this generality. In contrast to
Japan's obligations, the U.S. measures generally do not impose new
norms on corporate behavior and business customs. Although the SII
includes a proposal for the reform of U.S. antitrust laws, specifically,
to reduce the civil liability of enterprises engaged in joint venture pro-
duction by eliminating treble damages awards in suits brought by pri-
vate parties, this measure was strongly pushed by domestic industries
in the United States and also the Executive Branch before the SII.
moval or reduction would drastically improve the export opportunities of U.S. exporters to those
countries as priorities for action.
31. This also included the purchase of super-computers by national universities and govern-
ment research institutes.
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Despite doubts about the applicability of the SII model to other
situations, negotiations like the SII can be advantageous for several
reasons. First, bilateral negotiations are particularly appropriate for
resolving problems peculiar to the parties concerned. The SII ad-
dressed such U.S.-Japanese trade problems as the huge trade imbal-
ance, the intensive competition in research and development in high
technologies, the existence of a wide disparity in competitiveness in
some sectors of industry, and the high degree of economic dependence
of the Japanese economy on that of the United States. These are
problems which may lend themselves to a better resolution in a bilat-
eral forum rather than a multilateral forum such as the GATT, where
a more diverse group of countries and interests are involved.
In addition, the major focus of the SI was structural problems --
not only differences in national economic laws, but also differences in
the Japanese government's public spending and land policies and the
customs and behavior of Japanse corporations. At present, there is no
international forum, including the GATT, in which to conduct multi-
lateral trade negotiations to solve problems of this kind. At present, a
bilateral forum may be the only option.
Informality is another feature of the SII. Informal negotiations
have the advantage of addressing trade issues in a flexible and prompt
manner. When conflicts are imminent and immediate attention is re-
quired, a more informal and expedited process than multilateral nego-
tiations may be necessary. As was evinced by the SII, a direct clash
can be avoided by quickly resorting to an informal negotiation. In
multilateral negotiations, as was evidenced by the Uruguay Round, it
is difficult to come to a consensus on difficult problems within a short
period of time.
While there are important advantages to bilateral trade negotia-
tions like the SII, the shortcomings of this approach should not be
overlooked. One such shortcoming is that solutions reached in a bilat-
eral context may have unexpected and adverse impacts on third-party
countries. In the context of the SII, for example, the parties agreed
that the Japanese government should relax its control of sales using
premiums. Since such premium sales are not regulated in the United
States, Japanese enterprises in the U.S. market have an advantage
compared to U.S. enterprises in the Japanese market. The liberaliza-
tion of premium sales in Japan would correct this imbalance and
would thus be advantageous to U.S. enterprises. In Europe, however,
premium offerings are prohibited in some countries - if Japan com-
pletely liberalizes premium offerings to satisfy the U.S. government's
request, European enterprises, which are not accustomed to this com-
Winter 1991]
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merical practice, will encounter more difficulties in the Japanese mar-
ket than will U.S. enterprises. Another example is the Japanese Fair
Trade Commission's tightening of the antitrust regulation of sole im-
port distributorships. The guidelines, which will soon be announced
by the Fair Trade Commission, reflect a concession to the U.S. claim
that the sole import distributors in Japan have engaged in anti-com-
petitive activities. However, European enterprises claim that there are
advantages in sole import distributorships and that such activities
should not be unduly restricted.
The above-mentioned shortcomings are the inevitable result of any
bilateral trade negotiation in which the interests of third-party coun-
tries are generally left out. Although the new rules resulting from the
SII are to be applied on a non-discriminatory basis, the changes made
on the basis of one country's request may not always be in the interest
of third countries.
Another shortcoming of the SII is that some reform programs
were set up too quickly in response to immediate political pressure
without consideration for consistency and symmetry in the laws of Ja-
pan. The Anti-Monopoly Law reform is illustrative of this problem.
Proposals to modify the law and its enforcement procedures include
an increase in administrative fines, an active utilization of criminal
penalties and the use of private damages actions.32 The objective of
the U.S. government is to simultaneously strengthen all of the above
enforcement mechanisms of the Anti-Monopoly Law. However, in-
creasing administrative fines while at the same time imposing criminal
penalties may create a situation of "double jeopardy" prohibited by
the Japanese Constitution. 33
CONCLUSION
In spite of its many shortcomings, the SII succeeded in mitigating
political tensions between the United States and Japan, at least for a
short period of time. As a result of the SII, the Japanese government
has agreed to implement measures such as land policy and antitrust
reforms. This signifies that the SII filled a gap created by the lack of
political leadership in Japan.
However, the coverage of the SII remains too narrow since it con-
centrated only on the pressing issues of the time. There are still areas
32. The administrative fine is a European device employed by EC and German administra-
tive authorities. In the United States, the criminal penalty and private damages system is widely
used instead of administrative fines.
33. Article 39 of the Japanese Constitution provides that no person shall be condemned more
than once for the same crime.
[Vol. 12:436
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which need to be addressed, such as institutional harmonization in in-
dustrial policy and intellectual property rights, the establishment of a
dispute settlement mechanism and cooperation in macro-economic
policy. It should be emphasized that a bilateral negotiation such as
the SII should be a supplement to - and not a substitute for - the
GATT. At a time when the GATT's institutional basis is weak and its
enforcement power is insufficient, a supplementary system like the SIT
is necessary.
